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ON DETECTING SPOOFING STRATEGIES IN HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING
XUAN TAO, ANDREW DAY, LAN LING, AND SAMUEL DRAPEAU
ABSTRACT. Spoofing is an illegal act of artificially modifying the supply to drive tem-
porarily prices in a given direction for profit. In practice, detection of such an act is chal-
lenging due to the complexity of modern electronic platforms and the high frequency at
which orders are channeled. We present a micro-structural study of spoofing in a simple
static setting. A multilevel imbalance which influences the resulting price movement is
introduced upon which we describe the optimization strategy of a potential spoofer. We
provide conditions under which a market is more likely to admit spoofing behavior as a
function of the characteristics of the market. We describe the optimal spoofing strategy
after optimization which allows us to quantify the resulting impact on the imbalance af-
ter spoofing. Based on these results we calibrate the model to real Level 2 datasets from
TMX, and provide some monitoring procedures based on the Wasserstein distance to detect
spoofing strategies in real time.
Keywords: Spoofing, High Frequency Trading, Imbalance, Limit Order Book.
1. INTRODUCTION
The act of spoofing is a specific trading activity that aims at artificially modifying the
supply on the market without intent to trade to move it away from its equilibrium. One
might profit from the resulting short term price movement by canceling the previous supply
while the market comes back to its equilibrium. Such a strategy implies that the spoofer
should be able to act anonymously, fast and in a market where all the other agents react
to offer and demand. In this regard, with the recent rise of centrally cleared venue and
high frequency algo-trading, the ground for the existence of spoofing schemes is rising,
see Shorter and Miller [21].1 In a competitive market where many potential spoofers are
present, spoofing behavior might cancel out, but most regulations consider it as illegal. For
instance, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act prohibits spoofing – defined as activity of bidding or
offering with the intent to cancel before execution – that can be prosecuted as “a felony
punishable by up to $1 million in penalties and up to ten years in prison for each spoofing
count”.2
Yet, for several reasons, detecting and prosecuting spoofing behavior is a challenging prob-
lem. First is the sheer amount of data produced from high frequency trading across many
financial products and venues. Second, it is usually impossible to trace in real time who
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is behind every trade. From a CCP viewpoint, they mainly have access to the broker ID
through which the trade has been channeled resulting only in aggregated informations.
Furthermore, a potential spoofer might post those trades through different venues and bro-
kers. Third, aside from a loose definition, it is unclear how a spoofing strategy differs
quantitatively from other strategies and what is the resulting impact. Thus the complexity
of quantifying and discriminating spoofing strategies from legitimate ones. Based on the
above points, it seems difficult to provide an efficient way to monitor the market for spoof-
ing behavior.3 However, a potential spoofer is also confronted to the constraints of modern
electronic trading platforms. Indeed, from the basic spoofing description, the spoofer has
to act rapidly in a complex and high frequency environment. Therefore, it must rely on fast
– henceforth simple – algorithmic strategies which, due to the complexity of the dynamic
structure of a limit order book, is based on aggregated signal.
Along these lines, we intentionally address a quantitative analysis of spoofing in a simple
setup. As a basis for this study, let us consider a simple example. We suppose that in the
next period the limit order book shifts up by one unit with a probability p¯ and down by
one unit otherwise. From the perspective of an agent whose objective is to purchase two
shares, it faces the following three idealized situations.
1 - Immediately post a buy market order for a total cost of
Cˆ = 10 + 11 = 21
2 - Delay the buy market order for one period resulting in a total average cost of
C˜ = (1− p¯) (9 + 10) + p¯ (11 + 12) = (1− p¯) 19 + p¯23
which is smaller than Cˆ if and only if p¯ < 1/2, hence a bearish market.
1− p¯
p¯
3 - Delay the buy market order and post a sell limit order of one share at a distance of
one unit from the best ask price to artificially modify the offer and demand resulting in a
temporary more bearish state p < p¯.4 Doing so, with a probability q, its sell limit order
is executed through an incoming market order walking the limit order book beyond one
unit. For this executed sell order, the agent receives an average price of q((1−p)10+p12)
while its inventory increases in average to 2 + q. The cost of buying back this increased
3Aside from obvious cases or exogenous approaches as for insider prosecution.
4We suppose that during this time period, if the market moves through limit order posting/canceling, the agent
keeps its sell limit order one unit away from the best ask price by rapidly canceling and posting again.
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inventory minus the gain from selling its limit order results in an average net cost of
C = (1− p) (9 + 10 + q11) + p (11 + 12 + q13)− q ((1− p)10 + p12)
= (1− p)19 + p23 + q
1− p
p
From this simple situation, a profitable spoofing situation depends on the value of p¯, how
bearish p < p¯ the market reacts to an increase of one share at a distance of one unit from
the best ask price, as well as the probability q of being adversarially executed through a
market order during this time. The goal of this paper is to study the interplay between
these different factors. In particular the impact on the price movement as a function of
the spoofing size and depth in the limit order book. Based on this study, we present some
approaches to track spoofing behavior and calibrate those to real market data.
We model the impact of the offer and demand on the price through the volume imbalance
often taken as the ratio of the volume of the best bid divided by the total volume on the
best bid and ask. Since the spoofer never intends to have their orders executed, spoofing
is more likely to happen beyond the top of the limit order book since the possibility of
getting executed is too high which results in a negative payoff to the spoofer. To take this
into account we weight the impact on the imbalance in terms of depth as follows
ı¯ =
∑
v¯−k wk∑(
v¯−k + v¯
+
k
)
wk
where v¯±k represents the volume on the bid/ask k units away from the best bid/ask and wk
is the relative impact on the imbalance at level k. If the agent posts a sell limit order v on
the ask side at tick level k0, the imbalance moves to
ı(v) =
∑
v¯−k wk∑(
v¯−k + v¯
+
k
)
wk + wk0v
≤ ı¯
If we denote by dpn the probability of a price deviation of n units, the dependence on the
imbalance ı is given as follows
dpn = ıdp
+
n + (1− ı)dp−n , n = . . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .
where dp±n represents the price deviation when the imbalance is at its extreme. When the
imbalance ı is low/high – the offer/demand dominates – the price distribution is biased
downwards/upwards through dp±. The agent can influence the price distribution in a non
linear way through the volume it posts:
v 7−→ dp(v) := ı(v)dp+ + (1− ı(v)) dp−
Given the probability dq of a sell limit order hitting the limit order book up to a given level
the resulting net average cost of spoofing turns out to be
C(v) = pH + (1−Q)G(H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost for optimal situation
+Hµ+ (2ı(v)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spoofing impact
+ QG(H + v) + vν︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost for being caught wrong way
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where H is the initial objective of shares to acquire, G is the liquidity costs from walking
through the limit order book, µ+ > 0 is the mean of dp+,Q (resp ν) is the probability (resp
mean beyond k0) of being executed beyond k0. From this expression, there is a competitive
aspect between the risk of being caught on the wrong side and the fact of pushing ı(v) way
beyond 1/2 to get Hµ+(2ı(v)− 1) ≤ 0.
In a theoretical part we first provide conditions for the limit order book to admit spoofing
manipulation5 as a function of the initial imbalance ı¯, local sensitivity of the imbalance w,
overall price impact µ+, liquidity cost G as well as the initial objective H . In short, this
model confirms several intuitive facts when spoofing is more likely to occur
• if the probability Q of the spoofing order being executed is small;
• if the local sensitivity wk0 or the overall price impact µ+ is large;
• if the amount of share H to buy is large with respect to the depth of the limit order
book;
• if the initial market imbalance is close to 1/2.
• away from the top of the limit order book;
As for the depth of the limit order book – how liquid the market is – the results are incon-
clusive. For this to be taken into account, one should account for how the above mentioned
parameters depend on the liquidity of the limit order book. The subsequent empirical study
shows that it is the case, but we can not derive conclusions from this model as in Shorter
and Miller [21] where illiquid markets seems more likely to be prone to spoofing. We
then address the impact of spoofing on the resulting imbalance ıspoof = ı(vspoof ) after
spoofing and discuss its dependence as a function of the aforementioned parameters as the
imbalance modified by a spoofer can be compared to the steady state one. We characterize
and discuss the deviation for the imbalance as a function of the different parameters. In
particular as a function of the depth where the spoofing order is posted. We finally address
the situation of a market maker using spoofing strategies for a positive round trip payoffs.
Based on this study, we can theoretically discriminate spoofed imbalance from steady state
one. The main idea for potential spoofing detection is to compare the imbalance before and
after each market order. If the market is on steady state, the imbalance after a legitimate
market order should come back to its current steady state ı¯. On the other hand, if the mar-
ket order is the result of a spoofing pattern as described in the simplified aforementioned
model, the imbalance before the market order should be of the form
ı∗ ≈ b
b+ a+ wv
<
b
a+ b
= ı¯
while returning to its market steady state as soon as the spoofed volumes are canceled. The
theoretical part provides a first approximation how ı∗ deviates from ı¯ as a function of the
market parameters.
We calibrate the parameters of this model as well as the weighted imbalance on several
Level 2 data sets provided by TMX. Based on the theoretical results we provide possible
quantification procedures using real time monitoring of a conditional Wasserstein distance
of short term imbalance histories against the long run imbalance history in order to track
eventual spoofing behavior.
Before addressing the relevant literature, let us expose the shortcomings and modeling
choices of this approach. The micro-structure dynamic of the limit order book at high
frequency is highly complex. To excerpt some key impact of spoofing behavior we delib-
erately concentrate on a static situation where the dynamic of the market is ignored.6 For
instance, we do not consider situations where compound spoofing behavior happens. We
5In other words, better than immediate or delayed market order.
6Since we consider the limit order book beyond its top, a dynamic version of the present approach would
result into a fairly complex and high dimensional dynamic programing problem.
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furthermore assume that there exists a single potential spoofer and that the market is in-
finitely reactive in the sense that it comes back to its steady state driven by the imbalance.
There is no implicit game between the market and the spoofer where the market acknowl-
edge the potential existence of a spoofer. There is also no competitive game between two
or more spoofers. Also, even though we shortly address the situation of a round trip for
a market maker and the resulting optimal spoofing behavior, we take the viewpoint of a
market taker willing to purchase/sell a given amount of shares. The overall goal being a
basic understanding of spoofing in its most simple nature, quantify the resulting impact
and derive potential detection procedures. Refinement of this approach, other take on, as
well as more adequate quantification procedures are topics of further studies.
1.1. Literature review. There exists a solid stream of research showing that even rational
speculative activities might destabilize prices, have an adverse effect on market efficiency
or eventually leads to different forms of arbitrage; From market speculation based on var-
ious form of information asymmetries, for instance Hart and Kreps [14], Allen and Gale
[3] or Jarrow [15], to price manipulation in limit order books using different market im-
pact assumptions and trading strategies, as studied in Alfonsi and Schied [1], Alfonsi et al.
[2], Gatheral [10], Gatheral and Schied [11]. The specific case of spoofing behavior has
not yet been the subject of much theoretical study.
Although many high frequency trading strategies are legitimate, Shorter and Miller [21]
point out that high frequency trading firms may engage in potentially manipulative strate-
gies involving the usage of quote cancellations. Lee et al. [16] empirically study the change
in spoofing behavior following a change in volume disclosure rules on the Korean Ex-
change (KRX) at the start of 2002. Up to the end of 2001 the KRX disclosed the total
volume of shares on both sides of the book and also the volumes at each tick up to 5 ticks
from the best ask/bid. At the start of 2002 the KRX stopped disclosing the total volume
on both sides in an effort to stop spoofing, but increased the disclosed volumes at each
tick from the first 5 to the first 10 ticks from the best ask/bid. They show that spoofing
is profitable and spoofers tend to prefer stocks with higher return volatility, lower mar-
ket capitalization, lower price and lower managerial transparency. This study suggests the
importance of the depth of book on spoofing strategies and potential price manipulation
being carried out through a form of “volume imbalance”. Wang [24] followed a similar
methodology in empirically studying spoofing on Taiwan’s index futures market. They
found consistent results on the impact of spoofing on the market, but without the novel
testing ground on changes in the disclosure of volumes deeper in the limit order book.
Some other studies to detect price manipulations are mainly based on learning algorithms.
Among other, Cao et al. [5, 6] based on the definition of spoofing in [17] use K-nearest
neighbour, one class support vector machine and adaptive hidden markov models to clas-
sify the data. Miranda et al. [18] characterize spoofing and pinging as full and partial
observability of Markov decision processes. Under a reinforcement learning framework,
they find that in order to maximise the investment growth, a trader will always employ
spoofing or pinging orders except when market adds extra transaction costs or fines. In
contrast to these empirical studies, our approach focuses on the micro economic features
of spoofing behavior, in particular using our main stylized factor âA˘S¸ imbalance, which
measures the difference between bid and ask side.
Concerning the impact of the imbalance on direction of the price movement: Lipton et al.
[17] use the definition on the top of the book for the imbalance and study the impact
on the trade arrival dynamic and resulting price movement. They fit a stochastic model
for this behavior on real market data. Cartea et al. [7] employ volume imbalance as a
signal to improve profits on the liquidation of a collection of shares in a dynamic high-
frequency trading environment. Gould and Bonart [12] fit logistic regressions between the
imbalance and the direction of the subsequent mid-price movement for each of 10 liquid
stocks on Nasdaq, and illustrates the existence of a statistically significant relationship.
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Xu et al. [26] compute the imbalance at multi position in the limit order book and fit
a linear relationship between this imbalance and the mid-price change. They find that
the goodness-of-fit is considerably stronger for large-tick stocks than it is for small-tick
stocks. The impact of order imbalance on prices has also been studied by Cont et al. [9] and
Bechler and Ludkovski [4], for example. Bechler and Ludkovski also found that including
characteristics of deeper parts of the book may be necessary for forecasting price impact.
However, due to the nature of their dataset, they were only able to look at an aggregated
form of the depth of book while we are able to use the exact volumes at all depths in
the book. Sirignano [22] also used the book volumes beyond the touch to model price
movements in a deep learning setting. Further suggesting the impact of depth of book on
predicting future price movements.
Finally, the closest work to the present one in terms of quantitative analysis of spoofing
behavior in relationship with imbalance is from Cartea et al. [8]. They adopt a dynamic
approach where the trader influences the imbalance to derive the optimal strategy. They
calibrate their model to market data and provide trading trajectories for the spoofer showing
that spoofing considerably increases the revenues from liquidating a position. While being
in a dynamic setting, in contrast to the present study, everything happens at the top of the
limit order book for the imbalance to be manipulated. Furthermore, we do not focus here
on the resulting gains from the spoofer, be rather on the impact on the imbalance from
spoofer as for detection purposes from a regulatory viewpoint.
1.2. Organization of the paper. The first Section introduces the model, the imbalance
and the dependence of the price movement on that imbalance. The second Section presents
the spoofing strategies, addresses the theoretical conditions for spoofing behavior to happen
and provide the resulting imbalance after spoofing together with numerical illustrations. It
also addresses the situation of a round trip from a market maker viewpoint in this model.
The third Section is dedicated to the calibration procedure of the model on real Level
2 market data from TMX. The last Section discusses and introduces some quantitative
approach to track spoofing behavior in real time illustrated on real datasets.
2. LIMIT ORDER BOOK, LIQUIDITY COSTS AND IMBALANCE
The ask price is denoted by p and the limit order book on the ask side by v¯ = (v¯0, . . . , v¯N ),
that is, v¯0 is the volume posted at ask price p, v¯1 the volume posted at p+ δ, etc. where δ
is the tick size. We denote by v¯− = (v¯−0 , . . . , v¯
−
N ) the limit order book on the bid side.
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Given a limit order book inventory v¯ on the ask side, we define for an amount of share
H ≥ 0 the function
F (H) := inf
{
x ∈ N0 :
x∑
k=0
v¯k ≥ H
}
which represents how many positive price tick deviation an order of size H generates.
Given an amount of shares H to buy, a bid price p and an ask limit order v¯, the resulting
costs of the market order is
pH +
F (H)∑
k=0
kδv¯k − δF (H)
F (H)∑
k=0
v¯k −H
 = pH + δG(H)
The term G on the right hand side represents the liquidity costs depending only on v¯.
Remark 2.1. Throughout the theoretical part of this work we assume that the limit order
book is blocked shaped with an amount a > 0 of shares at each price level of the ask side.
We then get the continuous approximation
F (H) ≈ H
a
and G(H) ≈ H
2
2a
7That is v¯−0 is the volume posted at bid price p
− < p, v¯−1 the volume posted at p
− − δ, etc.
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As for the imbalance of the limit order book, measure of the difference between offer and
demand, we proceed as follows. Letw0, . . . , wN with
∑N
k=0 wk = 1 andwk > 0, a weight
for each tick level k, and a limit order book inventory v¯−, v¯ on the bid and ask respectively,
we denote by
B¯ =
N∑
k=0
wkv¯
−
k = 〈w, v¯−〉 A¯ =
N∑
k=0
wkv¯k = 〈w, v¯〉
the weighted average bid and ask volumes. We define the imbalance as
ı¯ :=
B
B +A
∈ (0, 1)
Remark 2.2. In a blocked shaped setting, if b denotes the amount of orders on every price
level on the bid side, we get
ı¯ =
∑N
k=0 wkb∑N
k=0 wk(a+ b)
=
b
a+ b
which yields b = aı¯/(1− ı¯).
The price deviation in the next period can be triggered by two events. The posting and can-
cellation of incoming limit orders as well as the posting of market orders. We distinguish
between both, since the former does not have an impact on the execution of existing limit
orders while the latter has. We generically denote by
dp = {dp−N , . . . , dp0, . . . , dpN} µ =
N∑
x=−N
xdpx
dq = {dq−N−1, . . . , dq0, . . . , dqN+1} ν =
N+1∑
y=−N−1
ydpy
the distribution and mean, respectively, of the two possible price movement in the next
period. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the imbalance does not have an impact
on incoming market orders and that the price deviation with respect to the market orders is
neutral, that is ν = 0. We furthermore assume that they are independent of each others.8 To
reflect the fact that the imbalance, as an indicator of the offer and demand on the market,
has an impact on the market makers, we consider a parametrization ı 7→ dp(ı) of the price
movement driven by limit orders as a function of the imbalance ı. Since the imbalance
moves between 0 and 1, we assume that the distribution dpmoves as a convex combination
of ı between the distribution dp− – distribution when the imbalance is close to 0, that is
highly skewed to the left – and the distribution dp+ – distribution when the imbalance is
close to 1, that is highly skewed to the right. Mathematically:
dp(ı) = ıdp+ + (1− ı)dp−
From the skewness assumptions and symmetry of the imbalance indicator, we assume that
dp+x ≥ dp−x for every x ≥ 0 and dp+x = dp−−x for every x
which implies that
µ(ı) :=
N∑
x=−N
xdpx(ı) = (2ı− 1)
N∑
x=−N
xdp+x = µ
+(2ı− 1)
8The subsequent theoretical study adapt to eventual joint distribution of price movement due to limit and
market orders also jointly dependent on the imbalance. The exposition of which is no longer explicit but can be
solved numerically.
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By assumption, µ+ is positive, showing that µ(i) moves between−µ+ and µ+ and is equal
to 0 for an imbalance of 1/2 when offers equal demand.
3. SPOOFING STRATEGY
Suppose that at a given time we are given an ask price p and a limit order book inventory
(v¯−, v¯). A trader willing to buy an amount H of shares faces the following three options.
• Immediate market order: for a total costs of
pH + δG(H)
• Delayed market order: for an average total cost of
N∑
x=−N
N+1∑
y=−N−1
[(p+ δ(x+ y))H +G(H)] dpx (¯ı) dqy
= pH + δ
(
G(H) +Hµ+ (2ı¯− 1))
Clearly if ı¯ < 1/2, then this second option is better than a direct buy.
• Spoofing and delayed market order: Book first an ask limit order v at a depth k in
{0, 1, . . . , N} on top of the ask limit order book v¯k to increase the liquidity on the ask side
and signal a surge in supply to the market. In the next period the price deviates from p to
p+ δ(x+ y) and two situations may happen:
– y ≤ k: no market order of sufficient magnitude hits the limit order book and therefore
this limit order is not executed against an incoming market order. The previous limit
order is canceled and the amount H of shares is acquired for a cost of
(p+ δ(x+ y))H + δG(H)
– y > k: the limit order is executed against an incoming market order at a price level
p+ δ(x+ k). The new objective moves to H + v resulting in a net cost of
(p+ δ(x+ y)) (H + v) + δG (H + v)− (p+ δ(x+ k)) v
= (p+ xδ)H + δG(H + v) + δ(y − k)v
It follows that the spoofing net cost for a price deviation of p+ δ(x+ y) is given by
(3.1) Ck(v, x, y) = (p+ (x+ y)δ)H + δG
(
H + v1{y>k}
)
+ δ(y − k)v1{y>k}
However, the posting of the selling limit order modifies the imbalance from ı¯ to
ık(v) :=
B
A+B + wkv
In other words, the imbalance will move downwards, shifting the distribution dp to more
favorable outcomes. Since we assume that ν = 0, it follows that the average net costs are
given by
Ck(v) :=
N∑
x=−N
N+1∑
y=−N−1
Ck(v, x, y)dpx(ık(v))dqy
=
N∑
x=−N
(p+ δx)Hdpx(ık(v))+ δ(1−Qk)G(H)+ δQkG(H+v)+ δv
N+1∑
y=k+1
(y−k)dqy
= pH + δ(1−Qk)G(H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost for optimal situation
+ δHµ+ (2ık(v)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spoofing impact
+ δQkG(H + v) + δvνk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost for being caught wrong way
where
Qk =
N+1∑
y=k+1
dqy and νk =
N+1∑
y=k+1
(y − k)dqy
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Note that this cost functional is convex in v since G and ık are convex functions. Note
also that in order to take advantage of this spoofing impact, it is necessary to drive the
imbalance ık(v) below 1/2.
Remark 3.1. Note that we implicitly assume that the spoofing only happens at a given
depth k. It is possible to spoof simultaneously at different depths resulting in a slightly
more complex cost function that can be solved numerically. The conclusions do not change
qualitatively and we use the more general multi-depth spoofing for the analysis of data in
the subsequent sections.
3.1. Existence of Spoofing Manipulation. The question is whether it is possible to push
the imbalance as much as possible to 0 in order to offset the costs of posting selling orders,
they being executed and paying the liquidity costs of buying them back.
Definition 3.2. We say that the limit order book (v¯−, v¯) admits a (market taker) spoofing
manipulation if there exists v > 0 and k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} such that
(3.2)

Ck(v) < pH + δ
(
G(H) + µ+H (2ı¯− 1)) if ı¯ ≤ 1/2
Ck(v) < pH + δG(H) if ı¯ > 1/2
According to the average costs of spoofing, these two inequalities turn into
(3.3) Qk [G(H + v)−G(H)] < 2µ+H
(
ı¯ ∧ 1
2
− ık(v)
)
− vνk
The following results concerns the existence of spoofing manipulation in a blocked shaped
setting where the volume on the ask side of the limit order book is a everywhere. For scal-
ing reasons let H = ρa, where ρ represents the ratio of the shares to purchase to the depth
of the limit order book. Our first result concerns the existence of spoofing manipulation.
Proposition 3.3. In a block shaped setting, where the volume on the ask side of the limit
order book is a everywhere. The following assertions hold
• If ı¯ ≤ 1/2, the limit order book admits no spoofing manipulation if and only if (3.4)
holds;
• If ı¯ > 1/2, the limit order book admits no spoofing manipulation if (3.4) holds.
Where H = ρa and
(3.4) 2ρµ+ (1− ı¯) ı¯wk ≤ Qkρ+ νk for all k
Proof. Let H = ρa, and the imbalance ık(v) = b/(b + a + wkv) with b = aı¯/(1 − ı¯). It
follows that the gradient of ık(v) is given by
∇ık(v) = − b
(a+ b+ wkv)
2wk = −
(1− ı¯)
aı¯
ı2k(v)wk
If ı¯ ≤ 1/2, from the previous equations, since g(x) = x2/(2a), it follows that there is no
spoofing manipulation if and only if
f(v) := Qk
v2
2a
+Qkρv + vνk − 2ρaµ+ (¯ı− ık(v)) ≥ 0
for any v ≥ 0. Taking the gradient for this function yields
∇f(v) = Qk v
a
+Qkρ+ νk − 2ρµ+ 1− ı¯
ı¯
ı2k(v)wk
which is a monotone functional in v. Since f(0) = 0, it follows that f(v) ≥ 0 for any v if
and only if ∇f(0) > 0 which is equivalent to
Qkρ+ νk ≥ 2ρµ+(1− ı¯)¯ıwk
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If ı¯ > 1/2, there is no spoofing manipulation if and only if
f(v) := qk
v2
2a
+ ρqkv − qkkv − 2ρaµ+ (1/2− ık(v)) ≥ 0
for any v > 0 the gradient of which is given by
∇f(v) = qk v
a
+ ρqk − qkkv − 2ρµ+ 1− ı¯
ı¯
ı2k(v)wk
Since f(0) > 0, as previously argued, it follows that f(v) ≥ 0 as soon as ∇f(0) > 0,
which yields the same conditions. 
From this proposition, we deduce that price manipulation is more likely to occur
• if Qk is small – and as a byproduct νk. If the probability to get a spoofing order
executed is small, there is relatively no downsize at spoofing.
• if ı¯ is close to 1/2. If the imbalance is close to 1/2, then ı¯(1− ı¯) is maximum. The
impact of moving the price in ones favor is maximal there.
• if µ+ is large: µ+ represents the mean deviation sensitivity as a function of the im-
balance. The more sensitive the price movement is with respect to the imbalance,
the more likely spoofing strategies may occur.
• Ifwk is large: wk represents the relative impact at tick level k of a spoofing volume
to the imbalance. If one of wk is large with respect to the corresponding Qk, then
spoofing is more likely to occur there.
• if ρ is relatively large. If the amount of order to buy relative to the overall offer is
very large, spoofing is more likely to happen.
Figure 1 represents the spoofing in terms of the initial imbalance ı¯ with varying market
parameters.
FIGURE 1. Spoofing condition (3.4) as a function of ı¯ and in (a) µ+ =
1ρ = 1, k = 3, wk = 0.2, dqi = 0.025 for all i ≥ k. One parameter
is increased each time with respect to (a) where (b): dqi = 0.03 for all
i ≥ k; (c): µ+ = 2; (d): ρ = 2; (e): wk = 0.5; (f): k = 4.
3.2. Optimal Spoofing and Resulting Imbalance Impact. Let us now address the prob-
lem of finding the optimal spoofing strategy. In particular as a function of the depth at
which the spoofing order is placed.
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Proposition 3.4. The optimal spoofing volume vspoof at a given level k and resulting
imbalance ıspoof – adopting the notations w := wk, Q := Qk and ν := νk – are given by:
vspoof =
a
Q
[
2ρwµ+
1− ı¯
ı¯
ı2spoof − (Qρ+ ν)
]+
where ıspoof is the unique cubic root solution in (0, ı¯] of
ı¯
ı
= 1 +
(1− ı¯)w
Q
[
2ρwµ+
1− ı¯
ı¯
ı2 − (Qρ+ ν)
]+
Proof. Adopting the notationsQ := Qk, ν = νk, w = wk,H = ρa, the goal is to optimize
over v ≥ 0 the objective function
f(v) = (1−Q) (ρa)
2
2a
+Q
(ρa+ v)2
2a
+ ρaµ+ (2ı(v)− 1) + vν
=
(ρa)2
2a
+Q
v2
2a
+ (Qρ+ ν) v + ρaµ+ (2ı(v)− 1)
First order condition with Lagrangian λ yields
Q
v
a
+ (Qρ+ ν)− 2ρwµ+ 1− ı¯
ı¯
ı2 = λ
where ı := ı(v). Solving as a function of ı in (0, 1), we get
λ(ı) =
[
(Qρ+ ν)− 2ρwµ+ 1− ı¯
ı¯
ı2
]+
v(ı) =
a
Q
[
2ρwµ+
1− ı¯
ı¯
ı2 − (Qρ+ ν)
]+
Given now the optimal v(ı) as a function of ı, we solve for ı such that
1
ı
=
a+ b+ wv(ı)
b
=
1
ı¯
+ w
1− ı¯
aı¯
v (ı) =
1
ı¯
+
w
Q
1− ı¯
ı¯
[
2ρwµ+
1− ı¯
ı¯
ı2 − (Qρ+ ν)
]+
Since the left hand side in strictly decreasing on from∞ to 1ı¯ on (0, ı¯] and the right hand
side is increasing from 1ı¯ , on (0, ı¯], there exists a unique solution which is a cubic root. 
Though the solution is implicit, we can inspect the spoofing behavior as a function of
the distance to the top of the limit order book. Note first that ıspoof = ı¯ if and only if
2ρwµ+(1 − ı¯)¯ı ≤ Qρ + ν which results into vspoof = 0. This coincide with the no
spoofing condition of the previous proposition. We are interested on the relative spoofing
size as a function of these parameters. From the definition of the imbalance, ı(v) increases
if and only if v decreases, so we get more spoofing volume as ıspoof gets smaller. Now
from the implicit function it holds that
1
ı
=
1
ı¯
+
w
Q
1− ı¯
ı¯
[
2ρwµ+
1− ı¯
ı¯
ı2 − (Qρ+ ν)
]+
=: f
(
w, µ+, ν,Q, ı¯, ρ, ı
)
where the function f is an increasing function of ı greater than 1/ı¯.
• Since f is increasing as a function of w and µ+, it follows that ıspoof is decreasing
as a function of w and µ+. Hence, spoofing behavior increases as a function of the
impact w at level k on the imbalance as well as a function of the overall sensitivity
µ+ of the price movement with respect to the imbalance.
• Since f is decreasing as a function of Q and ν, it follows that ıspoof is increasing
as a function of Q and ν. From an empirical viewpoint, Q = Qk as well as
ν = νk decreases as a function of the depth k. It follows that spoofing behavior is
more likely to happen and increase deeper in the limit order book. However, this
conclusion is short of the fact that local sensitivity of the imbalance w = wk also
depends on the depth with an inverse impact. According to empirical analysis, it
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turns out that w does not exert this decreasing behavior as a function of k at least
within a reasonable depth in the limit order book. It seems that spoofing behavior
is more likely to happen at a reasonable distance from the top of the limit order
book.
The behavior of the resulting imbalance ıspoof as a function of the initial imbalance ı¯ is
more difficult to stress out. We know that ıspoof ≤ ı¯ and for the same reasons as before it
is increasing as a function of ı¯. The same holds for the dependence on the relative number
of shares to purchase ρ. Figure 2 represents the curves of the spoofed imbalance ıspoof (¯ı)
as a function of the initial imbalance ı¯ for different depths with varying market parameters.
FIGURE 2. ı as a function of ı¯ and in (a) µ+ = 1ρ = 1, wk = 0.2, dqi =
0.003 for all i ≥ k. One parameter is increased each time with respect
to (a) where (b): dqi = 0.006 for all i ≥ k; (c): µ+ = 3; (d): ρ = 3;
(e): wk = 0.5; Blue line :k = 0; red line: k = 2; orange line: k = 4.
3.3. Round Trip Situation. In this paper we mainly focus on the spoofing behavior from
a market taker’s viewpoint. As for a market maker, spoofing behavior might be rewarding
as well. However, as seen in the following subsection, the rewards from spoofing are
intertwined with the ones from pure market making.
We present a simple situation together with the numerical analysis in a blocked shape
setting with the same model assumptions as before. We assume that the potential market
maker spoofer acts as follows: At the first stage it decides to spoof with a volume v at
depth k on the ask side to drive the price down and acquire an amount H of shares after
this price movement. When the market comes back to its steady state, it liquidates H and
eventually buys back v if it has been executed. We assume that v and H are decided at the
very beginning.9
9This stylised situation makes strong assumptions and simplifications. First H is decided at time 0 even if it
is executed after the price movement. This is to prevent conditional optimization. Second, the liquidation of the
inventory H and v occurs separately. Once again, to provide simplified optimization problem, while we could
numerically consider a liquidation of the net inventory H − v. Finally, a second spoofing could happen at the
second stage as in the previous section to liquidate the inventory.
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After spoofing a volume v at level k, as soon as the price moves the spoofer executes its
market order H for a revenue of
− (H − v1{y>k}) (p+ δ∆ + δ(x+ y))− δGa(H)− δ(y − k)v1{y>k}
where Ga(H) = H2/(2a), p = (p+ + p−)/2, and ∆ = (p+ − p−)/(2δ) is the effective
spread in ticks. The spoofer then waits for the market to return to its steady state and
liquidate the resulting inventory with market orders. For ease of computation, we assume
that it executes two market orders: One for H and one for v if it has been executed10 for a
revenue of
Hp− δ∆H −Gb(H)− 1{y>k} (v(p+ δ∆) + δGa(v))
Adding both and integrating yields an average net revenue of
R(H, v)
δ
= −H (2∆ + µ+ (2ık(v)− 1))−Ga(H)−Gb(H)
+Qk
[(
k + µ+ (2ık(v)− 1)
)
v −Ga(v)
]
= −H (2∆ + µ+ (2ık(v)− 1))− 1
aı¯
H2
2
+Qkv
[
k + µ+ (2ık(v)− 1)
]− Qk
a
v2
2
From this equation, we can derive the following remarks concerning the decision of the
spoofer:
• If v = 0: This corresponds to the classical situation where a market maker takes
advantage of the temporary market movement to execute a market order and cash
out at a later time when the market comes back to its steady state. Clearly, it gets
a positive gain if and only if
ı¯ ≤ 1
2
− ∆
µ+
In particular, if the effective spread ∆ is large, or if µ+ is small, then it is impossi-
ble or the initial imbalance should be very small. In the case where this happens,
then H¯∗ is given by
H¯∗ = aı¯
(
2∆ + µ+ (2ı¯− 1))−
with corresponding revenue of
R¯∗ =
1
2
[
aı¯
(
2∆ + µ+ (2ı¯− 1))−]2
• If H = 0: This corresponds to the classical situation where a market maker posts
limit orders at a given depth to gain from possible fluctuations. This results in
corresponding average revenue given v of
Rˆ(v) = Qkv
(
k + µ+ (2ık(v)− 1)
)− Qk
a
v2
2
From this equation, even if the spoofer gets a positive gain of k ticks buy execut-
ing its order, it will drive the imbalance ık(v) below 1/2 and face adverse price
movement that will offset its gains. The optimal vˆ∗ = vˆ∗(¯ı) in that situation is not
explicit, but can be easily numerically implemented and corresponds to an optimal
revenue of
Rˆ∗ = Qkvˆ∗
(
k + µ+ (2ık(vˆ
∗)− 1))− Qk
a
vˆ2
2
10Combining both in terms of H − v1{y>k} is cost effective but complicates the exposition of the result.
13
In general, solving for the optimal H is straightforward with
H∗ = aı¯
(
2∆ + µ+ (2ık(v)− 1)
)−
and corresponding average revenue:
R(v)
δ
=
1
2
[
aı¯
(
2∆ + µ+ (2ık(v)− 1)
)−]2
+Qkv
(
k + µ+ (2ık(v)− 1)
)− Qk
a
v2
2
These two effects are difficult to disentangle from a truly spoofing gain when H as well as
v are strictly positive. However, this can be done numerically and the results are presented
in Figure 3, where the spoofing region – H > 0 as well as v > 0 – is indicated. We also
provide the plots of H¯∗ as well as vˆ∗ against H∗ and v∗.
We can however draw some stylised facts about the spoofing behavior from this market
maker viewpoint. The impact of the different parameters – initial imbalance ı¯, probability
of getting executed Qk, local sensitivity of imbalance on the price impact w = wk as well
as overall price deviation µ+ are similar to the previous case. However, in addition to the
previous part, the effective spread ∆ acts negatively on the spoofing opportunity in that
context. Indeed, a positive market order H is only triggered if µ+(2ı∗−1) ≤ −2∆, which
requires a spoofed imbalance satisfying
ıspoof ≤ − ∆
µ+
+
1
2
If ∆ is too large or µ+ too low, a spoofing strategy is no longer rewarding.
FIGURE 3. ıspoof as a function of ı¯ and in (a) µ+ = 3,∆ = 0, k =
1, wk = 0.1, dqi = 0.001 for all i ≥ k. One parameter is increased
each time with respect to (a) where (b): dqi = 0.002 for all i ≥ k;
(c): µ+ = 4; (d): ∆ = 2; (e): wk = 0.4; (f): k = 4. Red area:
v∗ = 0, H∗ = 0; Dark blue area: v∗ = 0, H∗ > 0; Light blue area:
v∗ > 0, H∗ > 0; White area: v∗ > 0, H∗ = 0.
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4. CALIBRATION
According to this model, we calibrate the imbalance as well as dp and dq on real data
provided by TMX. These datasets consists of level 2 data from June to September 2017.
Among the 1500 equities we selected 9 varying in company background, market capital-
ization as well as trading frequency. The level 2 datasets include time, order price, volume,
type — buy/sell; booked/cancelled/traded —, order ID and counterpart order ID in case of
a trade, see Figure 4
FIGURE 4. Original Level 2 dataset of stock AEM provided by TMX.
Since these are provided in diff form, therefore a cumulative aggregation allows to con-
struct the full limit order book at any time as in Figure 5
FIGURE 5. Generation of the full limit order book out of the Level 2 data.
This operation is computationally heavy and therefore has been realized on a distributed
data cluster of TMX with spark.
With the full limit order books at hand we divide the calibration into two steps:
• Find a normalized sample frequency and depth N ;
• Calibrate the imbalance generically, that is, as a function of the weights w =
{wk}k=0,...,N ;
• Estimate dq, dp± and weights w = {wk}k=0,...,N .
The sample frequency should be large enough such that there exists enough variance in
price change, see Figure 6
FIGURE 6. Left panel: Histogram of original AEM price change. Right
panel: Histogram of AEM price change after sampling.
To compare across markets with different trading activity—and eventually time during
the day—we fix a target variance of σ2 for the price movement and select the optimal
frequency f for each stock as to minimize the square distance between σf and σ. For a
target variance σ2 = 2, Table 1 is the sample frequency for different stocks with a summary
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statistics of the average volume and arrival rate for Market/Limit Orders on the bid and ask
side. As for the depth N , we take the 99% quantile of empirical sampled price change
distribution.
Stock f N
Market Orders Limit Orders
Buy Sell Buy Sell
Vol Rate Vol Rate Vol Rate Vol Rate
AEM 2 5 119 0.076 120 0.070 148 6.655 148 6.856
BMO 11 4 172 0.110 168 0.130 150 2.480 152 2.560
CNR 6 4 141 0.104 134 0.100 139 2.400 142 2.401
CPG 53 5 311 0.131 95 0.116 873 1.766 885 1.746
HVU 16 4 518 0.079 464 0.078 579 1.823 577 1.810
HXU 26 3 845 0.004 902 0.004 2498 0.905 2578 1.195
PPL 26 4 142 0.101 152 0.110 167 2.312 184 2.470
SSO 28 3 133 0.031 38 0.033 353 1.992 360 1.916
VUN 50 2 305 0.001 473 0.001 2561 0.809 2690 0.738
XEG 213 3 1422 0.020 1587 0.018 3573 1.854 3659 1.926
TABLE 1. Stock data from June 5, 2017 to June 9, 2017. The Vol
columns corresponds to the average volume per seconds and the Rate
columns corresponds to the number of orders per second.
With the sampling frequency f and depth N , we define the average imbalance at time t as
ıˆ(w, t) =
∑
k≤N
∑
t−f≤s<t
v¯−k (s)wk∑
k≤N
∑
t−f≤s<t
(
v¯−k (s) + v¯
+
k (s)
)
wk
which sums up order book volumes within a certain time interval weighted by time dif-
ference ∆si = si+1 − si. The weighting parameter w impacts the average imbalance
distribution, see Figure 7.
FIGURE 7. Distribution of the average imbalance for different weights
for the BMO stock.
Nevertheless for each weight vector, the resulting distribution is close to a skewed normal
distribution. For a given weight w, using maximum likelihood, we fit the empirical dis-
tribution to the corresponding skew normal distribution SN (α(w), ξ(w), ω(w)), the fit of
which is particularly good, see figure 8 for an example.
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FIGURE 8. Histogram of BMO average imbalance and fitted skewnor-
mal distribution: w = [0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2].
The third step is to determine dq, dp± with the optimal weights w. As for dq, it is the
probability that the price moves by k ticks triggered by market orders. Thus for each
market order, compute
F (H) = inf{x ∈ N0 :
x∑
k=0
vk ≥ H}
where H is the volume of the market order. This represents exactly how many positive
tick price deviation an order of size H will produce. We derive dq from the empirical
distribution.
As for dp± and w, a maximum likelihood estimation is implemented to solve
(4.1) dp∗, w∗ = arg min
dp+,w
[
− 1
M
M∑
m=1
log p (xm, ıˆm, w)
]
where xm is the empirical price change, ıˆm the average imbalance for a given weight w,
p (xm, ıˆm) = dpxm (ˆım) p(ˆım)
where dpxm (ˆım) = ıˆmdp
+
xm + (1− ıˆm) dp−xm represents the conditional probability of
price change equal to xm given ıˆm, and p(ˆım) is the density of the fitted skewnormal
distribution for a weight w evaluated at ıˆm.
Figure 9, illustrating the value of the optimal weight w for selected stocks, shows differ-
ent patterns. Overall, it turns out that the relative impact of the imbalance to the price
distribution is more important away from the top of the limit order book.
We also performed this calibration procedure on stock BMO weekly from June 5th to June
30th, as well as for the first hour of trading monthly from June to September. Figure 10
provide the optimal weights in each case for BMO.
FIGURE 9. w for stock AEM, BMO, CNR, CPG, HVU, HXU, PPL,
SSO, XEG from June 5th, 2017 to June 9th, 2017.
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FIGURE 10. Left panel: w for stock BMO each week in June, 2017.
Right panel: w for stock BMO each month in June, 2017 only using first
hour trading data.
Notice that for the first hour of trading the optimal weights are more consistent across
time, but all show that the weight impact on the price movement happens deeper in the
limit order book.
As for the corresponding dp+ and dq, they are represented in Figure 11 for stock BMO
from June 5th, 2017 to June 9th, 2017. As expected, dp+, representing the price movement
as the imbalance is large, is skewed to the right.
FIGURE 11. dp+ and dq for BMO from June 5th to June 9th.
5. APPROACHES TO SPOOFING DETECTION
For reasons mentioned in the introduction, it is difficult from a regulatory viewpoint to
figure out whether or not spoofing happened a-posteriori. According to the theoretical
part, the act of spoofing will influence the resulting imbalance. However, to monitor the
imbalance is akin to contemplate pure noise as shown in Figure 12.
FIGURE 12. Imbalance of stock BMO from 09:30 to 16:00 on June, 7, 2017.
In the following, we propose some possible ways to perform such a monitoring based on
the theoretical results. The strategy comes from the following observation: For a spoofing
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strategy to be successfully fulfilled, a market order has to be executed.11 Hence when
observing an executed market order two situations may happen:
1- The market order is a legitimate one. In that case, the imbalance before this market
order ı− and after ı+ should follow statistically the classical long run behavior. In
other words, in a legitimate situation, we should observe statistically the pair
(ı−, ı+)
for each market order.
2- The market order is the result of a spoofing behavior. The implicit equilibrium
without spoofing would be the pair (ı−, ı+). After the market order is executed,
the market imbalance should be back to its equilibrium ı+. However before the
market order, the spoofer observes the implicit imbalance ı− and decides to spoof
according to this information, sending to the market ıspoof (ı−) instead of ı−. The
resulting observation for those spoofed market orders is therefore the pair
(ıspoof (ı−), ı+)
Furthermore, spoofing strategies are supposed to happen sporadically but intensively within
a short time horizon. Before presenting some strategies, let us fix some notations:
• Π = {t1 < t2 < . . . < tM} represents the time stamps of each (buy) market
orders in a long sample.12 For ease of notations, we relabel it by {1, . . . ,M}.
• ıˆ−(t) and ıˆ+(t) represents the imbalance before and after the market order hap-
pening at time t in Π.
• (ı−, ı+) represents the joint distribution of the imbalance right before and after
each market orders fitted to the overall data. We assume that these represents the
stable behavior of the market without spoofing.
• (ˆıN− (t), ıˆN+ (t)) represents the empirical distribution generated by the last s =
t, . . . , t − N + 1 observed imbalances (ˆı−(s), ıˆ+(s)), where N  M is a short
horizon sample size.
• The previous theoretical part, even if not explicit in terms of solution allows us to
compute numerically ıspoof (ı−) for a given implicit imbalance ı−.
5.1. Monitoring ıˆN− . A first idea is to monitor the short behavior ıˆN− as times passes to
test if it is statistically different from the equilibrium ı−. This is however not adequate
for the following reasons. First, this is not related to spoofing behavior and might reflects
some other market patterns. It is also not clear how to derive the magnitude of a potential
spoofing behavior. Second, and more importantly, the sequence of ıˆ−(t) for each market
order is highly dependent. Indeed, there might exists market conditions – bullish/bearish,
etc – such that a short horizon sample ıˆN− differs strongly from the long term behavior.
Figure 13 provides empirical evidence about the sequential dependence of the imbalance
ıˆ− as well as ıˆ+ over time.
11In this paper, we do not consider spoofing strategies involving only limit orders.
12Several weeks, either for the full day of selected time of the day.
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FIGURE 13. Left panel: ıˆ− autocorrelation of stock BMO on June 7,
2017. Right panel: ıˆ+ autocorrelation of stock BMO on June 7, 2017.
Red area is the 95% confidence interval of the autocorrelation.
5.2. Monitoring (ˆıN− , ıˆN+ ). The statistical link towards spoofing is the additional obser-
vation of the imbalance after the spoofing happen. This provides statistical a-posteriori
information about the implicit market equilibrium before spoofing which in case of spoof-
ing can not be observed. Figure 14 shows on the left panel the joint distribution (ı−, ı+)
while the right panel represents, based on the model of the theoretical part and calibration,
the joint distribution (ıspoof (ı−), ı+) would be in the case of spoofing. The spoofed joint
distribution is skewed to the left in comparison to the non-spoofed one, in accordance to
the theoretical analysis that spoofing decreases the imbalance – in the buy order case –
before a market order.
FIGURE 14. Left panel: Empirical joint distribution of (ı−, ı+). Right
panel: Joint distribution of (ıspoof (ı−), ı+)
A possible way to detect spoofing is therefore comparing the long run distribution (ı−, ı+)
with the short term empirical distribution (ˆıN− , ıˆ
N
+ ). These two distributions encode the
possibility to disentangle legitimate market behavior from spoofed ones. However, as in
the previous approach, the sequence of joint observation is once again not iid as previously
mentioned and pictured in Figure 13. For short time horizon, the market may be legitimate,
though far away from the long run distribution.
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5.3. Monitoring ıˆN− conditioned on ıˆN+ . To overcome the previous problem the next ap-
proach is to monitor ıˆN− conditioned on the current ıˆ
N
+ . From our hypothesis, ı+ represents
the current steady state of the market at equilibrium. It turns out that conditioned on ıˆ+(t)
the sequence of ıˆ−(t) is closer to iid.
FIGURE 15. Left panel: Autocorrelation of ıˆN− |ˆıN+ ∈ [0.329, 0.378] of
stock BMO on June 7, 2017. Right panel: Autocorrelation of ıˆN− |ˆıN+ ∈
[0.561, 0.61] of stock BMO on June 7, 2017. Red area is the 95% confi-
dence interval of the autocorrelation.
In order to detect spoofing behavior, instead of adopting a statistical test for which some
parametric assumptions on the distribution has to be made, we measure the distance be-
tween ı− and ıˆN− conditioned on the current observed imbalance ıˆ
N
+ using a conditional
2-Wasserstein distance.
For two distributions µ and ν the 2-Wasserstein distance is defined as
W2 (µ, ν) =
inf

∫
(x− y)2 pi(dx, dy) : pi1 ∼ µ, pi2 ∼ ν

1/2
=
 1∫
0
(qµ(α)− qν(α))2 dα
1/2
From a generic perspective, the conditional distance we consider is as follows: If we as-
sume that
(ı−, ı+) ∼ K(y, dx)⊗ µ(dy)
where µ ∼ ı+ and K(y, ·) ∼ ı−|ı+ = y, it follows that
(ıspoof (ı−) , ı+) ∼ Kspoof (y, dx)⊗ µ(dy) where Kspoof (y, ·) = K (y, ·) ◦ ı−1spoof
Hence given ı+ = y, we have
W2 (K(y, ·),Kspoof (y, ·)) =
 1∫
0
(
qK(y,·)(α)− ıspoof
(
qK(y,·)(α)
))2
dα
1/2
Heuristically we wish to monitor the following two quantities
W2
(
ı−, ıˆN−
) |ıN+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Distance from the short term imbalance ıˆN−
to the equilibrium imbalance ı−
given that ı+∼ıN+
and W2
(
ıspoof (ı−), ıˆN−
) |ıN+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Distance from the short term imbalance ıˆN−
to the spoofed imbalance ıspoof
given that ı+∼ıN+
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From the data, we can calibrate the joint distribution (ı−, ı+) as well as (ıspoof (ı−), ı+).13
Hence, we have a parametrization of K(y, dx) and Kspoof (y, dx) for every y. However
for each value ıˆ+(l) from the discrete distribution ıˆN+ we only have a single sample point
ıˆ−(l) at hand. In order to overcome this problem we will bucket the values of ıˆ+(l) in the
sample of ıˆN+ to get a Kernel approximation of ıˆ
N
− .
The monitoring strategy at a given time t in Π is given as follows
1 - Consider the discrete short term joint distribution (ˆıN− (t), ıˆ
N
+ (t)) given by the sample
(ı−(s), ı+(s)) , s = t, . . . , k −N + 1
of the last N pairs of imbalances before time t.
2 - We define the following L buckets of equal cardinality N/L
Jl =
{
s : s = t, . . . , t−N + 1, qıˆN+
(
l − 1
L
)
≤ ı+(s) < qıˆN+
(
l
L
)}
, l = 1 . . . , L
as well as the mid point of each
ıl =
L
N
∑
s∈Jl
ı+(s)
3 - For each l, we generate a random sample ıN,L− and ı
N,L
spoof of N/L points each drawn
from K(ıl, ·) and Kspoof (ıl, ·), respectively.
4 - For each l we compute the Wasserstein distances
W2
(
ıN,l− , ıˆ
N,L
−
)
and W2
(
ıN,lspoof , ıˆ
N,L
−
)
where ıˆN,L− is the discrete distribution out of the sample ıˆ−(s) for s in Jl. This is an
approximation for the Wasserstein distance
W2
(
ı−, ıˆNn
) |ıN+ ≈ ıl and W2 (ı−, ıˆNn ) |ıN+ ≈ ıl
5 - we aggregate all together and define the indicators
S
(
ı−, ıˆN− |ˆıN+
)
:=
1
L
L∑
l=1
W2
(
ıN,l− , ıˆ
N,L
−
)
S
(
ıspoof , ıˆ
N
− |ˆıN+
)
:=
1
L
L∑
l=1
W2
(
ıN,lspoof , ıˆ
N,L
−
)
Remark 5.1. To enhance the accuracy of this indicator, we run step 3 to 5 a couple of
times with different samples and average again.
13The former fits well with a joint normal distribution, while the second one with a skewed normal distribu-
tion, see Figure 14. Other parametrization could eventually be used too.
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FIGURE 16. S
(
ıspoof , ıˆ
N
− |ˆıN+
)
from June 5, 2017 to June 9, 2017. From
top to bottom are stock BMO, CNR, CPG, PPL respectively. Blue area
is the 95% confidence interval of S
(
ı−, ıˆN− |ˆıN+
)
. Red area is where
S
(
ıspoof , ıˆ
N
− |ˆıN+
) ≤ S (ı−, ıˆN− |ˆıN+ ).
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we address the question of assessing quantitatively eventual spoofing behav-
ior in high frequency trading. In a one period setting we present how a spoofing strategy
from a market taker or maker is designed by manipulating the imbalance at different depth
level to impact the subsequent price movement. We provide and discuss the conditions for
the market to allow for spoofing manipulations. We subsequently solve the optimization
problem from a spoofer perspective and derive/discuss the resulting imbalance after spoof-
ing as a function of the market parameters. We calibrate the weighted imbalance and price
movement impact to Level 2 data provided by TMX. Using these results we propose a
quantification instrument to monitor in real time eventual spoofing behavior on the market
using a conditional Wasserstein distance. We illustrate these results on the data provided
by TMX.
This approach is by no means a definitive answer to spoofing detection but rather a first take
on. The dynamic structure of the limit order book and strategy, the memory dependence of
the parameters over time, as well as the specificities of one market with respect to another
one are left to further study. Furthermore, there might be alternative approaches subject to
new research directions – monitoring arrival rates of orders, frequency of book/cancelling,
etc. – that could complement such a monitoring approach.
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APPENDIX A. APPENDIX 1
This section reveals some details in the procedure of calibration and spoofing detection.
A.1. Sampling Frequency f . In real market there exists a large amount of orders which
are posted "far away" from the best bid/ask price or cancelled right after booked. These
orders have little impact on the price so if the best bid/ask price change is computed as
the best bid/ask price difference between 2 consecutive orders, more than 96% of time the
price does not move, shown in the left panel of Figure 6. Instead, we extract orders every
certain seconds and compute price changes in this "new" dataframe. The sample frequency
f is the smallest number of seconds where the variance of sampled price changes σ2f is the
closest to a given benchmark σ2,
arg min
f>0
|σ2 − σ2f |
When f = 2s, stock AEM which is one of the most active stocks on the TSX has a wider
price change distribution and its variance is approximately equal to 2. So taking σ2 = 2,
we conduct tests for different stocks and do see improvements of price change distribution
shown in the right panel of Figure 6.
A.2. Computation of ıspoof . For t ∈ Π, ıˆ−(t) and ıˆ+(t) are computed as
ıˆ−(t) =
∑
k≤N
∑
t−f≤s<t−0.01
wkv
−
k (s)∑
k≤N
∑
t−f≤s<t−0.01
wk
(
v−k (s) + v
+
k (s)
)
ıˆ+(t) =
∑
k≤N
∑
t−0.01≤s<t+1
wkv
−
k (s)∑
k≤N
∑
t−0.01≤s<t+1
wk
(
v−k (s) + v
+
k (s)
)
For each ıˆ−(t), the optimal spoofing strategy v∗ can be solved explicitly from
v∗k = 1 +
(1− ıˆ−(t))wk
Q
[
2ρtwkµ
+ 1− ıˆ−(t)
ıˆ−(t)
ı2 − (Qkρt + ν)
]+
where ı = btbt+at+wkv∗k , ρt =
Ht
at
and Ht is taken as the size of the market order,
at =
N∑
k=1
∑
t−f≤s<t−0.01
vˆ+k (s)∆s
Nf
which is the average size of the limit order book between f seconds and 10 milliseconds
before a market order. In the same way, we define bt and
ıspoof (ˆı−(t)) =
bt
bt + at +
∑
k wkv
∗
k
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A.3. qıˆN+ . The short horizon sample size N is equal to 100.
(ˆıN− (t), ıˆ
N
+ (t)) represents the empirical distribution generated by the last s = t, . . . , t −
N + 1 observed imbalances (ˆı−(s), ıˆ+(s)), where N M is a short horizon sample size.
For ıˆN− (t) we buctet ıˆ
N
+ (t) to compute the wassterstein distance where qıˆN+ is listed in the
table below.
l 0 1 2 3 4 5
qıˆN+
(
l
L
)
0.082 0.403 0.512 0.637 0.761 0.934
ıl 0.301 0.473 0.584 0.688 0.822
TABLE 2. qıˆN+ (l/L) and ıl for l = 0, · · · , 5 for the stock BMO at
09:30:07.375 on June 7th, 2017.
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